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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CLINTON C. THOMPSON, 
Plaintiff,. 
vs. 




BRIEF O,F APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This iB an aetion by Plaintiff, as insured under a 
group accident insurance policy, to recover benefits pro-
vided in the policy for permanent and total disability. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On hearing before the District Court the Court 
granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment and 
Plaintiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
rl'he case is before this Court on appeal. Plaintiff 
'l'Plrn n'versal of the judgment of the Districi Court for 
1 
an order dirPeting judg1ll(•nt in favor of Plaintiff, or 
failing that an order remanding thP case to the District 
Court for trial. 
STATEMEN11 OF FACTS 
In .July, 196-1, Plaintiff was an employec of t1w StatP 
of Utah and was insured undp1· a group accident insur-
ance policy carried by the State of L;tah -1\'ith Defendant 
American Casualty Comriany. 
T\YO days prior to .July 19, 19G-1, Plaintiff had heen 
engaged in certain strennous physical exertion in unnsual 
circumstances. 
On t}w evening of .July 19, 19G-1, Plaintiff experiencerl 
severe seizures which started in his )pft arm and side 
and sprPad to his ·wholP body becoming full grand ma\ 
seizures. He was rushed to a local hospital wlwre the 
seizures continued for a period of approximakly 2-J. 
hours. As a result, Plainbff was rc•nderpd totally dis-
abled from performing any type of physical labor. m 
was sixty years of age at the tim('.. 
At the time nf the alll'ged aceident, Plaintiff was 
troubled with two or three underlying physical ailments. 
In 19-10 Plaintiff had been thrnwn from a horse and 
suffered a lwad injury ·which ('ansC'd occasional hlack-
outs. Brain rmrgery was ptTfonrwd sonw two yc•ars lnfrc· 
for removal of a large blood elnt and Plaintiff fnll\ 
recovered excPpt for a slight impairment in his left fore-
arm and hand, a result of some minor d_amagp to th<' right 
2 
side of tlw brain. For OV('l' twenty years Plaintiff lived 
and worlu-d nonnally without any unusual physical dis-
al1ility and without experiencing any blackouts or seiz-
1ues. Plaintiff also hacl some degree of arteriosclerosis 
(liankning o.f the arteries) and pulmonary ernphysemia 
(a lung ailnH'nt). 
For about five years prior to July, 1964, Plaintiff 
had 1rnrked in Salt Lake City as a night watchman and 
custodian, and more recently as a maintenance man. 
1 le connn<'nced work for the State in January, 1960. 
Srveral years prior thereto he had been a farmer in 
wntlH:•rn Utah. His duties during the past few years 
as nistodinn and maintenance man included cleaning 
floors and windows, dusting desks, miscellaneous carpen-
tr~· and plumbing wo.rk, moving furniture and changing 
lights. 
On .July 17, 196-t-, just two days prior to the seizure 
attaek dt>scribed above, and for a few days prior thereto, 
Plaintiff had been engaged in strenuous physical exertion 
undt>r unusual conditions. He had performed an entirely 
lliffc·rent type of work than that to which he was accus-
tonwd, to-wit: using a 35-40 pound jackhammer-type 
l"leetric drill to drill an opening through a concrete wall. 
'l'J1e work area was confined, a basement tunnel, and 
tenqwratnres were high. During part of the time, Plain-
tiff was assisted by another employee, but for most of 
the time he worked alone. 
Plaintiff stated that he had never performed work 
a:-; stn~nuous and under such conditions. He perspired 
1 \Pl'Y lteavilv and became completely physically ex-
l1a 11 st <'d. 
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Both Dr. Kenneth .J. Nielson, Plaintiff's physician, 
who treated him while in the hosiptal, and a specialist, 
Dr. E. Daniel Nusbaum, a neurologist, ·who examined 
Plaintiff, stated that while Plaintiff had pre-existing 
physical ailments or diseses, it ·was this strenuous physi-
cal exertion which precipitated the seizures resulting in 
the total disability. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S TOT AL DISABILITY WAS CAUSED BY 
AN ACCIDENT WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE TERMS 
OF THE INSURANCE POLICY. 
The Complaint sets forth the insuring terms of 
the policy alleging: . 
". . . Plaintiff sustained hodily injuries 
through accidental means which directly and inde-
pendently of all otlwr causes, caused plaintiff to 
become permanently and totally disabled." (R-1) 
The District Court erred in holding in its summary 
judgment that this total disability sustained by Plaintiff 
was not caused by an accident: 
" ... insuranee policies shonld be construed 
liberally in favor of tlw insured and their bene-
ficiaries so as to promote and not defeat the 
purpose of insurance." (Richards v. Standard 
Acc1'dent Ins. Co., (UtahL 200 P. 1017) 
"Accident assurance companies do business 
mostly with the common people, and the term 
'accident,' as used in these policies, should be con-
strued most strongly against the companies, and 
be defined according to the ordinary and usual 
understanding of its signifieation." (Moutzo11ko,' 
4 
v. Mufoal Ben., Health & Accident Ass'n. (Utah), 
25± P. 1005) 
AR has been set forth above, a short time prior 
to the seizures, Plaintiff, a 60-year-old man weighing 
approximately ] 50 ponnds, had engaged in unusual and 
Rtrenuous physiral exertion. He had used a jackhammer 
to drill through a concrete wall (not the floor), which 
rPqnired that the hammer he held and pushed against the 
'rnll. Temperatures were high and the working area 
was confined. 
Plaintiff's deposition, taken by Defendant's counsel, 
reveals certain significant facts. Plantiff stated that 
hiR custodial and maintenance duties which he regularly 
]lf'l'forrned for several years prior to the injury had 
1wt been physically hard. (Pages 6 and 7 - Thompson 
deposition) -When asked about the tunnel drilling, he 
~tated that he had never done that type of work before 
! and that he had never done anything as strenuous nor 
under such conditions. (Pages 13 and 33 - Thompson 
dr>position) He stated that at the end of the day he was 
eompletely exhausted and his clothes were saturated with 
S\n~at; that it was necessary when he got home to get 
into a tuh of water to revive his strength. (Page 32 -
Thompson deposition) He emphasized throughout his 
testimony that he had never done work so exhausting 
under snch circumstances; that even the farm work had 
not heen so bad, and it had been performed in the open. 
Plaintiff, at the time of the injury, was several years 
ol(lcr than when he ·worked the farm. (Page 33 - Thomp-
'on dPposition) 
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It is noteworthy that both physi(·ians W<'l'<~ irnpn•ssr·rl 
that the strPnuous ph:n;ieal activit~, was tlw pre<·ipitating 
c·ause of tlw injuri('S. Dr. :t\usbamn said, " ... hut with 
the status <'piJqitirns VPry lil\:t•Jy rm•cipitated h~' fatig111• 
and fluid loss, and elc.trolyte irnhalanrP associat<><l with 
the performance of heavy labor in a ronfined s1iacr·." 
Dr. NiPlson said, "rl1lw seizure was preeipitatPd b~- stn•n-
uous activity." 
A Ftah Supreme Court dPcision with reuiarkahlP 
similarities to this case is Richards v. Standard Accidrid 
Ins. Co., supra. There the insurPcl \\'as eovered h~' an 
accident insurance policy whirh eontairn•d provision> 
substantially like' the pres<mt policy. It insm·pd again1't 
" ... loss resulting from hoclily injnriPs ('fft>cted directly 
Pxclusively and inclepC'ncl<_•ntly of all otlwr causes, 
through accidental nwans, ... " Tlw in;;;nr<'d, while walk-
ing through a desert area from a mining site, <lied of 
snnstrokP. rrlw Court consiJ<_•red at l(•nµ;th tlw consi(ler-
able evidenee that sunstroke was a dist>asP hnt eonclndt'<l. 
" ... it is el<>arly manifest that sunstroke is covered by 
the words 'bodily injuriPs hy accidental mPans.' " The ' 
Court affirmed the Trial Court holding for tli<> bem·-
ficiary, concluding: 
''Our conclusions are tl1at thP term 'hoclily 
injnries' ·within tlw rnc•c.111i11g- of tlw 1iolicy L'll1-
hra('t'S sunstrok<> or a lwat strokP from the dirPct 
raYs of the sun; that tlw sunstroke• was it;-;l·ll 
in 'this ('ase an aeeicl<•ntal cause or means n•snlti11.~ , 
in tlw d<•ath of tlH' insnrP<l; that th<' co1ubinatio 11 
of nn<'x1wctPcl circumstarn·<•s, and particularly t]ll' 
miscalculation of the distance from the river to 
t!H• mining elairn, \Y<'l'<' aeei<l<>ntal rn\'ans nnr'-:1 11 ·(·! 
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ed1y proclueing an unforeseen and unforeseeable, 
nnusua1, and not to be expected result, and that 
on the admitted facts, the submittal of the issues 
to the jury was unnecessary; plaintiff being en-
titled to an instruction din•cting a verdict in her 
favor .... " 
'rhe Richards case was like the case at bar, particu-
larl>' with regard to the nature of the "accident.'' Here 
the insured engaged in strenuous physical labor in a 
confined, hot space. There the insured walked for several 
hours in the sun through desert heat. In both cases the 
"arcid(•nt," or precipitaing event, was not instantaneous 
hut continued over a period of time before it took its 
toll on the~ individuals. In the Richards case, it was the 
lwat and pffort over a period of several hours. In this 
case, it was the strenuous work in a hot, confined area 
ow•r a fe\v days. 
In th<:~ deposition, Defendant's counsel pointedly 
asked Plaintiff if he did not expect to be tired and ex-
haustPd \\'hen performing such work. Plaintiff said that 
a num c•xriects to be fatigued to a certain degree, but 
that he did not Pxpect to be as exhausted as he was. 
(Pages 13 and 14 - Thompson depo•sition) The same 
question arose in the Richards case coneerning the in-
tentional or Yoluntary nature of the insured's conduct 
or act. The Court ans\Yered: 
"Possibly grt>att>r care might have been exer-
cis(•tl hy Richards and his companions. Possibly 
all ·were nt>gligent in not taking more water and 
in 11ot adopting some additional precautionary 
nwasures. But negligence is not here involved. 
Fnder this policy it is not a defense which the 
appellant may invoke. 
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H 'T • tl • . l i~ e1 wr 1s 'vo untary exposnn' to danger' a 
defense. The policy does not contain su('h a pro-
vision. 
"rnless the deceased int0ndPd to produce the 
ven· result which occurred, the element of danger 
is both unimportant and immaterial, because, a8 
said in Interstate Business l\f en's Acc. Ass'n. v. 
Lester, supra: 
'Persons protected by accident insurance 
may incnr consciously hazards which may 
result in their injury or death without fo~­
feiting the insurance, unless the policy ex-
pressly excepts the hazards.' '' 
Certainly Plaintiff did not forese>e or anticipate the 
severe seizures or the resulting effeds - the total dis-
abl<'ment. 
Texts and cases indicate that there is some division 
of authority with respect to whether the insuring clauses 
of standard accident policies cover harm which result~ 
from or is caused hy strenuous t'xertion or Pxercise. See 
Couch on Insurance, Second Edition, Sections -U :13q 
and 41 :139. Utah and a large numher of jurisdiction~ 
allo\\' recovery under policies for harm resulting from 
unusual exertion and similar acts. See the follO\ving: 
Rupture of blood vessel whil<:' cranking an automobile, 
Homr>, Benefit Assn. 'l". Smith (Tex.), 16 S\V 2d 357; chok-
ing while attempting to S\Yallow a pi<·ee of beefsteak, Am-
erican Accide11t Co. v. Beigart, 9+ Ky. 5-1:7, 2:) SW 191: 
hernia cansed by lifting in the coursP of insured 's duties, 
Rauert v. Doyal Protcctire I11s. C'o., Gl Ida. G77, lO!i P. 
2d 1015; heart rupture of a man aern:..;torn<>d to lifting. 
caused by lifting an unusually hl'nxy \Yeight, Cullu1111' 1·. 
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Aetna Life Ins. Co., (Conn.) 199 A. 103; rupture of heart 
or heart vessPl by voluntarily lifting in the course of 
one's husin0ss, Plrdger v. Business M. Accident Asso. 
('I'C'x.), 228 S\V 110. 
Utah has dearly adopted a liberal rule in construing 
aeC'id<'llt policies. In the M outzmtkos case, supra, the 
poli('~· in qtwstio.n insured against "loss of limb, sight, 
or time, resulting directly and independently of all other 
eanses, from bodily injuries sustained through purely 
areidental means." The provision is almost identical 
to the poliey in this case. There the Plaintiff, while 
lifting a heaYy mining timber in the course of his employ-
mmt, sustained a rupture which necessitated an opera-
tion and confinement in the hospital. The insurance 
company contended that where a man simply injures 
himself in the regular course of his work by voluntarily 
lifting, especiall~v where he is lifting a timber of the 
~mme character that he is handling one after the other 
witliout any unforeseen happening to cause the injury, 
it doPs not come "'ithin the terms of the policy. 
1.'he Court ronclnded that the insured's act causing 
the hernia was, in fact, an accident. The Court quoted 
and approved the following statement from a Missouri 
ease: 
'''Any unusual and unexpected event attend-
ing tlw performance of a usual and necessary act,' 
whether the aet be performed by the party injured 
or by another, is ordinarily and usually under-
:stood to he an event which happened by accident. 
In the fore going cases it seems to us a too strict 
and illiberal definition of the term was adhered 
to. At any rate, they are not reconcilable with 
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tlw gent>ral trend of the hest consid('red American 
cases, ·which hold that accidPntal means are those 
'·'Thich produce effeets which are not the natnral 
and probable consequence of the act. 'An effect 
which is not the natural or probable consequence 
of the means which produced it, an effect which 
does not ordinarily follow and cannot be reason-
ahl~' anticipated from the use of such means, an 
effe<:>t which the actor did not intend to produce 
and which he cannot be charged with the design of 
producing, is produced by accidental means.'" 
See also to the same effect approving the foregoing 
rules and eases, Carter ·v. Standar.d Accidr11t Co., 65 
Utah 465, 238 P. 259. 
In the case of Handley v. llfotiwl Life Ins. Co. of 
New York, (Utah) 147 P. 2d 319, the insuring provisions 
of the policy were substantially identical to this case, 
although the circumstances of the accident were different. 
The Court discussed at some length the definition of 
"accidental" o·r "accident." Referring to the Richards 
case, the Court said, commenting· on Plaintiff's long 
walk in the sun : 
"Having determined that sunstroke \\'as an 
injury it chose also. to rest the decision on the 
ground that even though the <.~xtra journey was 
not accidental but intended the rcs11lt was un-
expected, unanticipated, and therefore acciden-
tal." (P. 322) 
And further on the Court says: 
" ... there is, as has been herdofore .i~ti­
mated, substantial authority for the proposition 
that whether the means are accidental is deter-
10 
mined hy th,, charader of their effects. '.Acciden-
tal rneans nrr those which produce effects which 
are uot their natural and probable consequences.'" 
(Emphasis added) 
And the Court concludes: 
" ... where it clearly appears from the evi-
dence that the operation set in motion definite 
particles of matter distinctly and directly trace-
able to the operation without which the proba-
bility is that they would not have been generated 
or st't in motion and it specifically appears that 
the action o.f that substance on a vital organ 
caused the death of the patient, such death was 
directly caused by an injury effected by violent, 
external and accidental means." 
Ree also JJJ etropolitan Life Ins. Co. vs. Funderburk 
(T\·xas Civil Avpeals), 81 SvV 2d 132, where it was held 
that the policy provisions covered the insured where 
insured suffered heat stroke while working in an oil 
tank ear where he had gone voluntarily to work with a 
1 iwting hammer and caulking tool, in the absence of 
any circumstances shmving that the insured should have 
anticipated heat exhaustion, or that he voluntarily as-
sumed the risk of a heatstroke. 
It is submitted that the District Court erred in hold-
ing- that the total disability sustained by Plaintiff was 
not <'aused bv an accident. The Utah cases, supported by 
other sound authorities, clearly hold that unusual and 
>trt>nuons exertion, such as that experienced by Plain-
tiff, is an "accident" within the terms of the policy. 
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POINT II 
WITHIN THE COVERAGE OF THE POLICY, PLAIN-
TIFF'S INJURY WAS SUSTAINED DIRECTLY AND INDE-
PENDENTLY OF ALL OTHER CAUSES. 
Tlw Distriet Court e1Ted in its summary jndt,'TIWnt 
in holding that if an accident oceurred Plaintiff was at 
the tinw sufforng from two disease or infirmities, which 
cooperated with the accident, resulting in the disability. 
CJ1he District Court failed to specify what those two di-
seases or infirmities were.) 
As heretofore set forth, the insnranee poliey which 
coven•d Plaintiff contained standard accident insuring 
language insuring against bodily injuries sustained 
through accidental means "dirp,ctly and independently of 
all other cmtses." 
It is conct>ded that Plaintiff had certain underlying 
infirmities or ailments but taking the testimony and 
statements of the two doctors as a whole, they point to 
the conclusion that the precipitating cause of the injury 
was tht> strenuous physical exertion. 
The general rule followed in lTtah, as set forth in 
the cases following, holds that benefits are recoverable 
under an accident insurance policy, even thongh the in-
sured had an existing physical ailment or disability which 
may have contributed to the death or injury. 
It will he important at this point to consider the 
medical eYidenee. Dr. Nusbaum, tlw neurological spe· 
eialist, examinPd Plaintiff. His lettf'r dated J annary 21. 
19G5 addressed to Continental~ ational American (]ron]l 
' 
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Insurance, contains a detailed report and evaluation of 
his examination. It concludes with the following: 
''He has a seizure disorder which resulted in 
tlie status epilepticus, probably a focal cortical 
onsf•t in the right hemisphere, secondary to a re~ 
mote brain and head injury, but with the status 
0pilepticus very likely prPcipitated by fatigue and 
fluid loss, and electrolyte imbalance associated 
with the performance of heavy labor in a confined 
svacP." (R-28) (Emphasis added.) 
Dr. Nusbaum mentioned the pulmonary problem 
(lnng ailment) in his letter but does no.t speak of it as 
a significant factor. 
In a letter dated September 26, 1964, attached to his 
deposition, Dr. Nielson, Plaintiff's attending physician, 
stated that in his opinion the seizures were the result of 
the prior brain damage, "precipitated by strenuous ac-
tivity.'' 
rl1he following excerpts are quoted from Dr. Niel-
rnn't-< deposition taken by Defendant's counsel: 
"Q: Now with reference to the last para-
graph which I have ;just read it is your opinion 
that at thE' time of the alleged accident Mr. 
rrhompson is eomplaining of there was an existing 
disPase or injury which contributed or which co-
operating with the accident resulted in his disa-
bility? 
''A: Yes, there was the underlying disease 
and something precipitated it obviously." 
(Nielson deposition - pages 16 and 17) 
"Q: Is it your opinion l\Ir. Thompson's 
brain was in a damaged condition, that he was 
13 
::mff Pring from a pulmonary disPai'w, and that tlw 
alleged ac>cident aggravated his previous brain 
damage or brain infirmity causing the resulting 
stroke and seizures? · 
''A: Yes." 
(Nielson deposition - pagt> 17) 
"Q : ... do I understand that even assrnn-
ing these underlying problems, he had the em-
physemia and the prior brain damage, that there 
had to he a precipitating cause that caused thr 
seizure activity? 
"A: 1llf e don't alwa~'s understand ·why a per-
son has a seizure at a particular time. \;Ve just 
aren't intelligent Pnough but there usually is, al-
though 'Ne can't always say what caused the seiz-
ure activity, there usually is. 
"Q : A precipitating ca use~ 
"A: Yes. We do know certain things. We 
do know the relative anoxia or lack of oxygen, 
electro.Iyte disturbance, ±1uid retention are all fac-
tors which bring- on seizures, precipitate seizures, 
I should say. 
"Q : Can these be caused by such things a~ 
strenuous labor? 
"A: Yes. 
"Q : Strenuous exercise~ 
"A: Related in one sense to a heart aittack, 
strpnuons Pxercise causes a relative lack of oxy-
gen to the heart and in a similar way it can causf' 
relative lack of oxygrn to a damaged brain and 
electrolyte impairmrnt dPfinitely precipitate~ 
seizures. 
(Nielson deposition - pages 19 and 20) 
"'Q: LPt me ask you this liypothrtically, 
Dodor: If a man has g01w on for SPVl1 ral ~·ear~ 
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\\'ithont S<':Wre activity and he does a certain 
typC' of work, rertain level of physical activity in 
his work and lw snddenly for a day or a few days 
engaged in 'Nork that is nnusually heavy, that is 
it is mnrh heavier than the work he is normally 
engaged in, where he perspires much more heavily 
than he normally ·would, what would you say about 
that as a precipitating canse of seizure activity? 
* * * * * * * 
"A: Yes, definitely it conld be a precipitat-
ing cause. I have no evidence whatsoever. That 
is beyond my capacity to know how much exer-
cise he did exert or was engaged in. 
"Q: But assuming? 
"A: Assuming that he did engage in an 
incrC'ased amount of physical exercise certainly 
could have precipitated it." 
(Nielson deposition - page 20) 
[n his de1)osition, Dr. Nielson also mentions chronic 
bronchitis but sa:n; that it was not a contributing cause. 
(PagP 1:2 - Nielson deposition) He also stated that 
obstructive pulmonary emphyst>mia could have been a 
<·ontributing cause, but with the Plt>ctrolyte abnormality. 
The doctor goes on to note that the electrolyte problem 
dl•wlops as a result of fluid loss when one has been 
\\·orking "bt>yond his usual capacity and with increased 
perspiration you lose a certain amount of sodium and 
llotassiurn ... the patient is mo.re susceptable to seiz-
ures." (Pagl'S 12 and 13 - Nielson deposition) Dr. 
Xidson also found that Plaintiff was suffering from 
arkriosclerosis (hardening of the arteries.). 
The rule outlined in one of the leading texts is that 
11' an accident sds in motion agencies which result in 
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disability or dc>ath, such accidPnt is r<'garded as the i'iolP, 
direct, and proximate cause of death, PVPn though thP 
injured person was sufforing from infirmity or disease. 
The total ultimate harm sustained is still regarded as 
caused by tht> accident, although the harm would not 
have lwen so st•vere had it not been for the pre-existing 
disease. An injury which causc>s tlw death of a person 
in impaired health or suffering from disease is the cause 
of his death, even though he would not have died if his 
health had not been impaired. Furthermore, recovery 
may be had under a policy providing for payment where 
"death is caused by external, violent and acridental 
means, independently of all otlwr causes, and excluding 
payn1ent wlwre death is caused fully from disease" if 
the accident is the proximate cause and sets in motion 
a chain of events leading directly to death, and notwith-
standing that a pre-existing disease contributed to death. 
Couch on Insurance, Second Edition, Volmne 10, SPction 
41 :85. 
There are two Utah decisions which bear signifi-
cantly on this issue. They hold that although the insurrd 
under an accident insurance policy was afflicted with a 
disease or ailment which contributed to the death or dis-
ability, that still such death or disability was the result 
of an "accident" within the terms of the policy. 
In Lcr, v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1938), 95 Utah 
445, 82 P.2d 178, Plaintiff sued to rt'cover double indem-
nity benefits for the death of lwr hnshand. The insuring 
ter;ns of the policy were substantinll:-.' identical to th1• 
policy in the ease at bar, containing the phrase "din•dly 
1G 
and independrmtl~r of all other causes.'' The insured, 
\\ Jiilc maneuvering a trailer, was pushed against the side 
of a building and the trailer tongue hit him in the right 
:-;ide of the abdomen. He subsequently became ill and 
\ms confined to bed. Later he was up and about but 
tlw illness continued and he Yrns again confined to bed. 
Ahout a month later, he was operated on for appendi-
t·itus and during the operation his gall bladder was re-
moved. Shortly thereafter, he died. It was discovered 
during the operation that the insured had been suffering 
from a diseased and infected gall bladder, whi0h infected 
condition had existed prior to the date of the blow to 
the stomach. The Court noted, giving Plaintiff's evi-
dence full credence, that the diseased and infected gall 
bladder had been rupture by the blow, causing the infec-
tion to spread and infect the appendix, making the oper-
ation necessary, which eventually caused death. The 
Court held that with "this chain of causation" the acci-
dPnt causing the injury, causing diffusion of the infec-
tion, c-ansing the appendicitus, and causing death, and 
for the purposes of the policy the accident and not the 
pre-Pxisting diseased condition of the gall bladder was 
the sole cause of death. The Court stated: 
" ... where an accidental injury sets in motion 
or starts activitv of a latent or dormant disease 
and such disPas·e co11tributPs to the death after 
having been so precipitated by the aecident, the 
disease is not a direct or indirect cause of death, 
nor a contributing cause within the meaning of 
the terms of the policy, hut the accident which 
started tlw mischief and precipitated the condi-
tion resulting in death is the sole cause of death." 
(Emphasis added) 
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In this case, Plaintiff had a "r(•tttoh• hrnin an<l lwad 
injm·y." He had (•x:pni<·nc·(•d no lllacl~outs, s<'izures or 
otlwrwise, for ovPr twenty y<'ans, hut wlwn the hravy 
exertion li1·ecipitatr•d thP ~wizur<'s the)' 1wgan in the Mt 
sidP of his hod:' tlwn'h:' indicating a relationship to thl' 
old head injury. 
In TVhitc c. National Postal Transport Ass'n. (1953), ' 
l l Ttah 2d 5, 2Gl P.2d 92~-, a ·widow sued to recover under 1 
thP provisions of an accidental death benefit policy for 
the death of her husband. Thr policy provisions werP 
even more limiting than in the present case. "Acciden-
tal death shall he construed to he either sudden, violent 
1 
death from t>xternal, violent and accid0ntal nwam; l'f'-
sulting directly, ind0pend<~ntly and exclusively of all 
other causes; ... tlH'n' shall he no liability whatever 
when disease, defect, or bodily infirmity is a contribut-
ing cause of death." The insured had been afflictrd with 
rlwmnatic fever in his childhood, whieh left him ·with a 
mechanically damag<•d heart. Tlw doctor who treated , 
the insured described his condition as "congestive heart 
failure or a heart \d1ich is no longer able to handle it~ 
load." This condition was also described as "advanced 
hPart disease and serious cardiac dis<>ase.'' He had 
what is known as Buerger's dist•as0. An ineident of tltl' 
insured·s h0art condition, when adive, was anriC'nlar 
fihrillaLon, or the throwing out by the heart of emlwli 
or frag1m•nts of bloo<l dots pm111iPJ out into the hod: 
that could blocl' circulation in a11 Px:tn•mity or in a yita1 
organ of the body. 'l'lH· insured wa;;; st rnC'k on tlH' cnlf 
of his right 1c•g h:· th<' c.onwr of a \1·oo<kn lwnC'lt ,,Jiirli 
was being 1110ve(l. A hruis<' d<•V(•lopPd \1-l1i('h lwc·nnw wr' 
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11ainful, and after a short time he \Vas confined to the 
hospital. The leg grew progressively worse. An operation 
was performed to remove the blood clot, but the leg did 
rn1t im]ffOVe and gangrene set in. Several weeks later 
tlw leg was amputated. About three and a half months 
later 1\·hile in the hospital, the insured died and the 
docto1· who examined him imnwdiately after death fixed 
the immediate cause of death as cerebral artery embol-
ism. rrhe Defendant insurance company refused to pay 
benPfits on the ground that the accidental bump on the 
l<'g was not directly, independently and ex!Clusively the 
r·ause of death but that the heart disease and Buerger's 
disease were at least contributing causes. At trial, the 
Plaintiff proceeded on alternate theories that the acci-
clPntal hlo\Y to the leg rpactivated or lighted up an in-
adi v<~ heart condition which led to the death, or that 
the blow :startPd an unbroken chain of circumstances 
11 hieh lt•d to tlte death, independently of any contributing 
l'au:s<~. All rnediral testimony at the trial agreed that in 
thPir best judgment the Plaintiff died from the enlarging 
ul' an (•mholns in the brain (cerebral embolism). The 
Co mt eonel nded, referring to the Lee case, supra: 
'''l'his Comt hdd that the Trial Court did not 
<>lT in snbmitting the case to the jury because 
th<:>n' \\as evidence that the blow had activated a 
donuant condition which contributed to the death 
aft<'r having bPen so precipitated by the accident. 
\V v conclndPd that if the ;jury believed that evi-
cl<•nce, the diseas<' was not a direct or indirect 
<'.allS<~ of death nor a contribuing cause within the 
llH'aning of the terms of the policy, but the acci-
<knt wh;eJ1 started the mischief and precipitated 
1 It<' eondition resulting in death was the sole cause 
of dPath." 
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"YiPwing tlw PvidPnC<' ns a wl10h' and in tlw 
light most favorable to th~3 respondent, \Ve find 
no error in suhrnitting the case to the jury under 
instructions Pmbod)·ing tlw respondent's two 
theories as to the cause of death.'' 
See also an Idaho eas<:>, Rm1rrt u. Loyal Protectit1r 
Ins. Co., s11vru, where the insured who died from an in- , 
ternal hernia had suffored, several years previous, a 1 
hernia or rupture which resulted in adhesions which 
formed a fibrous ring on the abdominal wall which con-
tributed to the injury and death. 
lfore Plaintiff was a 60-year-o.id man who many 1 
years previous had suffered a head injury which had re-
quired brain surgery and left him with minor brain dam-
age described by Dr. Nusbaum as "remote." For twenty 
years, Plaintiff lived and worked normally; he exper-
ienced no blackouts and no seizures. On July 19, 1964, 
two days after having engaged in unusual strenuous 
physical exertion, he suffered severe and prolonged 
seizures whieh resulted in total disability. rrhe medical 
experts who examined Plaintiff stated that the work lw 
had performed was extraordinarily hard and strenuous 
and pointed to this physical exertion as the precipitating 
cause of the seizures. 
POINT III 
THERE ARE ISSUES OF FACT WHICH SHOULD BE 
SUB1\1ITTED TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR DETERl\IINA-
TION. 
Plaintiff has set forth above his reasons and argu-
ments why the ruling of the District Court should he 
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n'V('l'S<'d and why summary judgment should be rendered 
in his favor. As an alternate argument, Plaintiff sub-
mits that there are basic and material issues of fact which 
should he submitted to the District Court for determina-
tion by the trier of fact. 
The two hasic issues m this case are (1) whether 
Plaintiff's injmy arose out of an accident, and (2) 
1rhcther the accident caused the injury independent of 
other causes. The essential facts in the case have been 
stated above and ,,rill not be reiterated here. Plaintiff 
lias attempted to show, based on the established facts, 
that under the decisions of this Court interpreting stand-
ard aecident insurance policies, there was an accident 
and that such accident caused the injury. In the first 
place, the unusual physical exertion Plaintiff un-
derwent was clearly an accident within the meaning of 
the policy as defined by Utah cases and the better au-
thorities of this country. Secondly, the medical experts, 
hoth the doetors who examined Plaintiff, point clearly 
tu this physical exertion under the conditions in which 
it was performed as the precipitating cause of the seiz-
nres. Certainly, if Plaintiff is not entitled to summary 
jndgnwnt, he is entitled to have these issues presented 
to the Trial Court. 
"Whether the death of the insured who was 
suffering from disease was caused solely by an 
aeic·i<lent or was contributed to directly or indirect-
l>T by the disease are questions of fact for determi-
nation hy the jury. Likewise, if the insured was 
snfft'ring from a hodily infirmity, ~b:iay have 
lwen suffering from such an infirmity, at the time 
of the aceident, the question whether the insured 
21 
died as a l'<'Slllt Of lJoclily injnrit•s, directl,\' and 
i11de1wnclentl,\· of all oth<>r carnws, nnd so!e]y 
through ('xtc•rnal. viol<>nt, and aceidental nwan~ 
is a qut>stion for the j1H)' to ddennin<>." ( Coucl; 
on TnsurancP, Yol. 10, See. -l-1 :91) 
80<> also tli<' lVliite eas(•, s11pra, and the language 
quoted from that deci::-;ion ·w]H·n·in this Court held that 
the Trial Court did not en in suhrnitting the case to 
tlw jury when' then' ·was evide>nce that the accident had 
activated a dormant condition ·which contrihuted to the 
death after having been precipitated by the accident. 
CONCLlTSION 
Con::-;idering the t>vidence hefore the Conrt which 
descrihed the nature> of tlH:.' aeridPnt, tlw extent of injury 
and tlw resulting total disahilit)·, and in the light of the 
interpretive decisions of this Court and of the better 
authorities, it is respectfully submitted that Plaintiff did 
suffer an accident and that such accidt>nt 'ms the cause 
of Plaintiff's total disability. rrhe judgment of the Trial 
Conrt should he reverst>d and judgnwnt he entered in 
favor of tlw Plaintiff. In the altf•rnatiw, this matter 
should be> remanded to the District Court for trial. 
Resp<:.>ctfnlly suhmittPd, 
GA RY 1 '· THEFIU~R 
-HO Nt->whonse Building 
Salt Lake City, Ptah 
:t'-:IJ1~L~,l'~~. CONDER. H ANSE~ 
AXD HEXROlD 
-1-10 N<'"'hons<' Bnilding 
Ralt Lab• Cit>·, Ctah 
Co1111sc1 for P1ni11tiff-AJiJJl'll1111f 
22 
